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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
grant relief to Embassy on its unjust enrichment claim where there 
was no meeting of the minds as to the terms for the sell of Lot 33? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews the trial court's 
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard of review for 
an abuse of discretion. This court reviews the trial court's 
conclusions of law based on those factual findings for correctness, 
according it no deference. Bellon v. Malnarf 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 
(Utah 1991). 
2. Did the trial court fail to make adequate findings of fact 
on Embassy's claims for relief? 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's findings of 
fact comply with Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) and are otherwise adequate and 
sufficiently detail for this court to perform its reviewr function 
is a question of law which is reviewed £g. novo. Acton v. Deliranr 
737 P. 2d 996 (Utah 1987); Rucker v. Dal ton, 598 P. 2d 1336 (Utah 
1979). 
3. Are the trial court's findings of fact Nos. 7, 11, 13 and 
14 clearly erroneous? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's findings of fact will 
be set aside if clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is clearly 
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erroneous if against the great weight of the evidence. Bellonr 808 
P.2d at 1091; Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
All statutes cited in this Brief are reproduced in the 
addendum pursuant to Rule 24(f). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. Course of Proceedings 
This case involves the sale of real property from Appellant 
Embassy Group, Inc.'s (Embassy) predecessor in interest, Shim 
Investments ("Shim"), a Utah limited partnership, to appellees, 
Daryl and Maureen Hatch ("Hatches"). Embassy is the assignee of 
all claims against appellees (Tr. 172). In August, 1990 Embassy 
commenced this action against the Hatches alleging alternative 
claims to recover $40,000.00 owed by the Hatches to Embassy for the 
sale of real property, or in the alternative to quiet title to the 
property against the Hatches and in favor of Embassy. (Tr. 1-15). 
The case was tried on December 12 and 13, 1991, without a jury 
before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby. At the conclusion of the 
trial, Judge Cornaby rendered oral findings and conclusions from 
the bench and granted judgment in favor of the Hatches, concluding 
Embassy was not entitled to recover under any of the claims plead 
(Tr. 154-164, R. 301-309). 
On January 23, 1992 Embassy filed objections to the Hatches' 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, requesting 
numerous modifications and amendments thereto (Tr. 165). On 
2 
January Cornaby entered judgment against Embassy 
»n, signea y 
Hatches without notification Embassy On 
June cue Hatches filec Memorandum Opposi^ * -
Embassy \_ abjection^ ^^ +-h^  proposea , 
Conclusions of Law u * * Judge Cornaby 
d(«ii it e d E "'sy " f 11 
2, Statement of Facts 
In c.Njily I'WHI, Shim, Embassy's predecessoi ' interest, 
i Bountjj-ui# ut;r 
totalling approximate, * Redd Hale » qeneral 
partnership. The agreed upon value of the property *\* 
"16") The! three lots were subsequently combined into one buildi 
] ot known as Bridlewood Subdivision Lot 13 (U, 18-19). 
During the summer c" i i ll*P*., .;ip(j<»J I  *.»i. I t a i \ \\ rI i ) 
expressed to Shim property manager Mark Wahlquist ("Wahlquist") a 
dosirr t" | "J? chanr I pi 33 ( K\ 22). After negotiations' in which 
Wahlquist informed Hatch that the value of Lot i i was $M i uou oo, 
Hatch offered to purchase the lot for $80',000.00 (R 23) Although 
offered to purchase 1 ot 3 3 for 
only $40,00C testified that during negotiations; Wat iJ qi list 
discussed the sale price of the property at between $100,000.00 and 
11 qui st ub1, ' ' ' approval to sell I ,ot 3 3 
*lthough Wahlquist' uperiors expressed some 
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concern for selling the property for $19,000.00 less than its value 
when received from Redd Hale (R. 23, 193). 
Subsequently, Hatch informed Wahlquist that his proposed 
mortgage lender had specified as a condition for the loan that the 
Hatches' building lot be less than one acre in size and cost a 
maximum of $40,000.00. Accordingly, Hatch requested that the 
closing documents in connection with the purchase of Lot 33 show a 
building lot of less than one acre in size at a purchase price of 
$40,000.00 (R. 25-27). To satisfy Hatch's first request, Wahlquist 
hired The Consortium, an engineering firm, to lay out a piece of 
ground from Lot 33 less than one acre in size on which the Hatches' 
home could be built (R. 27). The Consortium prepared, with Hatch's 
input, a legal description constituting the building site for the 
Hatches' home, describing "A portion of Bridlewood lot 33" with a 
total of .99928 acres. Wahlquist understood the Consortium 
document was to be used by Hatch in connection with obtaining his 
loan (R. 27-28; PI. Ex. "1"). 
To satisfy Hatches' request that the closing documents reflect 
a maximum cost of $40,000.00, Wahlquist agreed to a two step 
purchase agreement for all of Lot 33 for a total purchase price of 
$80,000.00. The first step would be $40,000.00 at closing 
($20,000.00 down, $20,000.00 on a note) for a portion of Lot 33. 
The second step would be the balance of $40,000.00 to be paid 
subsequent to the completion of the Hatches' new home on Lot 33 (R. 
33-34; PI. Ex. "6"). Hatch did not want a monthly payment schedule 
or specific time frame in which to pay the remaining $40,000.00. 
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Rather, Hatch wanted a general coituaitment t h a t I t be paid within a 
t wi i y i M i I in IIH 1 i ami ( l< '" , ii !" 1 . 
Wahlquist testified that and Hatch talked at considerable 
length about how Hatch was going to ; second $40,c 
Hatch indicated the funds wou 
home, and not from that source, he would have .rouble raising 
$4iir another source 33-35, 68). Hatch testified 
that when his pr: ., :u;nv 
home r he obtained $40,000,00 in equity (R. *- 2v 
>etween Wahlquist 
discussed above earnest Money Sales Agreement was prepared and 
signed appellee Maureen Hatch. The Earnest Money Agreement 
if "a portioi I of, Br :i ell eu :: ;od Si lb, ; i si oi I I .ot 
~n
 (
 I see Exhibit "A1111 for a total purchase price $40, • 0.00, The 
Exhibit "A" referred to in the: Earnest Money greement was the 
legal dese i j pi i nil pi np»ii v\i hy Tin.1 consortium dusei i b m q I hi1 "t'l'ViR 
acre portior • * J3 Hatch presented to the bank as h :i s - bi ii 1 ding 
lot J O - ^ U ; r±. jbA. "6" (emphasis added), PI. Ex. "I." and PI. 
E v t 
Closing on the sale c property took place on November 25, 
1986 ^u a ? uu.uu ash down payment l closing : 
signed a promissory note :rnr an additional $20, 000 
Wahlquist prepared a Warranty Deed transferring all of Bridlewood 
(emphasis added)). 
Wahlquist had debated with himself whether 
33 to Hatch at trie time of closing or only the portion . * 
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described in the Earnest Money Agreement and The Consortium legal 
description. Wahlquist decided to deed all of the lot to the 
Hatches because he felt the remainder of the lot could not be 
adequately developed since the severed building portion of Lot 33 
blocked access to the remaining portion of the lot. Further, 
Wahlquist trusted the Hatches to pay the remaining $40,000.00 for 
the second portion of the lot as they had agreed (R. 45-46). 
Wahlquist's trust was, in part, based on the fact that Hatch was a 
cousin of Wahlquist7s associate, Grant Bangerter, and Hatch and 
Bangerter had carried on discussions regarding family matters in 
Wahlquist's office. Because of this, Wahlquist was confident about 
deeding all of Lot 33 with the understanding Hatch would pay the 
remaining $40,000.00 within two years (R. 34-36). 
In approximately 1988, C. D. Larsen was reviewing Shim 
transactions for the purpose of preparing tax returns when it was 
discovered the Hatches had yet to pay the additional $40,000.00 for 
the purchase of Lot 33 (R. 198-199). Subsequently, demand was made 
upon Hatch for the remaining $40,000.00 (R. 203-205). The Hatches 
refused to pay the $40,000.00, claiming they agreed to purchase all 
of Lot 33 for only $40,000.00. Accordingly this action was 
commenced in August, 1990. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The evidence presented at trial was conflicting as to the 
terms for the sale of Lot 33. Each party had a different belief as 
to the lots purchase price. The documentary evidence was also 
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conflicting. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found 
that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to 
the price for Lot 33. Since there was no meeting of the minds, 
there was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33. However, 
the trial court failed to grant relief to Embassy under any of its 
claims. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant 
relief to Embassy under its unjust enrichment claim in that the 
clear weight of the evidence shows Embassy was entitled to such 
relief. The trial court specifically found that the value of Lot 
33 was $80,000.00. In addition, the trial court found that the 
parties failed to agree on the purchase price for Lot 33. Since 
there was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33 and since 
Embassy never intended to sell a lot valued at $80,000.00 for 
$40,000.00, it would be unjust for the Hatches to retain the 
$40,000.00 windfall they received at the expense of Embassy. 
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
award Embassy $40,000.00 in restitution damages under its unjust 
enrichment claim. 
II 
The trial court failed to mak- sufficient findings of fact to 
support its conclusions denying Embassy relief under any of its 
claims for relief. Embassy asserted five alternative claims for 
relief. However, the trial court failed to make specific findings 
on each of these claims. What findings the trial court did make 
are insufficient in that they fail to show the trial court's 
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judgment follows logically from and is supported by the evidence. 
Rule 52(a) Utah R.Civ.P., and Utah case law requires that specific 
findings of fact be made on all material issues and that the 
findings of fact be sufficient for this court to perform its review 
function. Otherwise, the trial court's judgment will be vacated 
and the case remanded for the entry of sufficient findings of fact. 
In light of the trial court's insufficient findings of fact in this 
case, this court should vacate the judgment and remand for entry of 
proper findings of fact. 
III. 
The trial court's findings of fact Nos. 7, 11 , 13 and 14 are 
clearly erroneous in that they are against the clear weight of the 
evidence produced at trial. Regarding Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 
14, the documents produced at trial show the erroneousness of the 
these findings. Regarding Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 13, the 
trial record clearly shows that the testimony the trial court based 
these findings upon was not given in this case. Accordingly, 
Findings of Fact Nos. 11 and 13 are clearly erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS 
AS TO THE TERMS FOR THE PURCHASE 
OF LOT 33# AND EMBASSY IS ENTITLED 
TO RESTITUTION DAMAGES 
Evidence presented at trial indicated there was never a 
meeting of the minds between Wahlquist and Hatch as to the terms 
for the sale of Lot 33. Embassy's counsel argued during closing 
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argument that the evidence showed there was never a meeting of the 
minds (R. 284). And, the trial court concluded in his oral 
findings at the conclusion of trial that there was no meeting of 
the minds between Wahlquist and Hatch. However, the court provided 
no relief for Embassy although the Hatches paid only $40,000.00 for 
Lot 33, which the court valued at $80,000.00. Since there was no 
meeting of the minds as to the terms for the sale of Lot 33, there 
was no enforceable contract, and the trial court erred in not 
awarding Embassy restitution damages to avoid the unjust enrichment 
of the Hatches at the expense of Embassy. 
A. There was no enforceable contract for the sale of Lot 33 
because there Was No Meeting of the Minds as to the Terms for 
its sale 
It is a basic principal of contract law that if there is no 
meeting of the minds of the parties as to all terms, there is no 
enforceable contract. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 
(Utah 1977). f,[C]ontractual mutual assent requires assent by all 
parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds 
meet as to all terms". Cessan Fin Corp. v. Meyerr 575 P.2d 1048, 
1050 (Utah 1978). 
Certainly, in order for there to be a meeting of the minds and 
thus an enforceable contract, the parties must have agreed on the 
purchase price. For example, in Davis v. Olsonr 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) this court affirmed the trial court's finding that 
there was no meeting of the minds as to the contract price to be 
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paid for the construction of four duplexes and, therefore, no 
enforceable contract. 
In Davis, as in this case, the trial testimony conflicted 
significantly as to the contract price. Plaintiff testified that 
he and defendant Olson orally agreed plaintiff would construct the 
four duplexes for cost plus $6,000.00 builder's profit per duplex. 
Based upon this oral agreement, plaintiff prepared a cost breakdown 
and submitted it to Wasatch Bank for acquisition of long-term 
financing and to defendant Olson. Defendant Olson, on the other 
hand, while conceding the price of costs plus $6,000.00 had been 
discussed, denied that he agreed to an open-ended deal. After 
plaintiff had submitted its cost breakdown to Wasatch Bank, 
defendant Olson prepared a written contract with a provision that 
costs were not to exceed $72,070.00 per duplex. Defendant Olson 
presented this proposed contract to plaintiff, claiming plaintiff 
said that he would sign it. The contract was never executed. Id. 
at 266-267. 
The Court of Appeals held that given the disparity in the 
testimony regarding the contract price, the trial court did not 
error in finding that there had never been a meeting of the minds 
as to the contract price nor as to the plans and specifications 
which formed the basis of the cost breakdown, icl. The court also 
approved of the trial court's decision to base recovery on quantum 
meruit in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendants. 
Id. at 268-270. 
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In the instant case the evidence shows there was no meeting of 
the minds between Embassy and the Hatches as to the contract price 
for Lot 33. First, there is ample evidence indicatincj persons 
involved with the transaction from Shim honestly believed they were 
selling Lot 33 for $80,000.00. Wahlquist testified Hatch offered 
to purchase all of Lot 33 for $80,000.00 after he had indicated to 
Hatch that the value of the lot was around $99,000.00. Wahlquist 
also testified that he never discussed with Hatch the purchase of 
all of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 (R. 23, 99). Larsen, from whom 
Wahlquist obtained approval to sell the lot, recalls giving 
approval to sell Lot 33 for $80,000.00 (R. 193). Larsen testified 
that he would not have approved the sell of all of Lot 33 for 
$40,000.00 in that he believed the value of the property was 
$99,000.00, the value given when Shim acquired the property from 
Redd Hale (R. 192-194; PI. Ex. "16"). 
Bangerter, who was a project manager for Shim and who worked 
closely with Wahlquist, testified it was his understanding, through 
conversations with Wahlquist and Hatch, that the purchase price for 
all of Lot 33, was to be $80,000.00 (R. 163, 166, 169-170). 
Bangerter#s understanding of the agreement was that Hatch was to 
purchase two parcels of ground. The first parcel was a portion of 
Lot 33 which was the building lot used by Hatch to obtain 
financing, for $40,000.00. The second parcel was the remaining 
portion of Lot 33 which was to be purchased by Hatch for an 
additional $40,000.00 paid within two years (R. 174, 175). In 
addition, two witnesses not associated with Shim or Embassy 
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testified that it was their understanding, through conversations 
with Wahlguist in 1986, that he was selling Lot 33 for $80,000.00 
(R. 118 -119, 132, 133). 
Hatch, on the other hand, testified that he believed he was 
purchasing all of Lot 33 for $40,000.00, although he also admitted 
Wahlquist had discussed the purchase price at between $100,000.00 
and $70,000.00 (R. 228, 243). Hatch also testified he and his wife 
wanted to spend only about $30,000.00 for a lot and indicated to 
Wahlquist that they wanted to stay in that price range (R. 240, 
242). Thus, the trial testimony conflicted significantly as to the 
purchase price for Lot 33. 
Not only does trial testimony indicate no meeting of the minds 
between the parties, but the various documents generated from the 
transaction conflict and do not indicate the parties agreed on the 
terms for the purchase of Lot 33. See Oberhanslv vs. Earle. 572 
P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) (Supreme Court upheld trial court's finding 
that a binding contract had not been created because the written 
agreement was ambiguous and conflicting, indicating no meeting of 
the minds between the parties). 
On the one hemd, the special Warranty Deed executed by Shim 
conveyed all of Lot 33 to the Hatches (PI. Ex. "lO"). The Deed of 
Trust executed by Hatch in favor of Shim conveyed all of Lot 33 
(PI. Ex. "8"). On the other hand, the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement provides for the sale of only "a portion of Bridlewood 
Subdivision Lot 33" for $40,000.00 (PI. Ex. "6"). In addition, the 
legal description prepared by The Consortium which was to be used 
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by Hatch to secure financing, and was to be attached to the Earnest 
Money Agreement as Exhibit "A" is entitled "A portion of Lot 33 
amended Bridlewood Subdivision Phase II more particularly described 
as follows", and describes a .9992 acre portion of property from 
Lot 33 (PI. Ex. "1" and "4"). 
The Hatches claim the Trust Deed and Warranty Deed support 
their claim that the contract price for all of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. However, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is clearly 
inconsistent with the Hatches' understanding since it evidences a 
contract for the sale of only a portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00. 
In addition, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is consistent with 
Wahlquist's testimony that the parties agreed that only a portion 
of Lot 33 would be sold for $40,000.00. This is also consistent 
with Wahlquist's understanding that the deeding of all of Lot 33 to 
the Hatches did not relieve them of their obligation to pay an 
additional $40,000.00 for the remaining portion of Lot 33. 
Similarly, the legal description prepared by The Consortium, 
as well as the circumstances surrounding its preparation, is 
consistent with Wahlquist's understanding that the purchase price 
for Lot 33 was $80,000.00. Testimony at trial indicated that The 
Consortium was hired to survey a portion of Lot 33 less than one 
acre in size on which the Hatches' home could be built. This was 
done to satisfy Hatches' mortgage lender who was requiring a 
building lot of less than one acre at a maximum cost of $40,000.00 
(R. 25-28). There is no reason for The Consortium to have been 
hired to prepare the legal description other than if the 
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transaction for the sale of Lot 33 had been as Mr. Wahlquist 
testified. That is, a purchase of a portion of Lot 33 for 
$40,000.00# and a second purchase for the remaining portion of Lot 
33 for another $40,000.00. 
Thus, the written documents generated from this transaction as 
well as the testimony conflict and do not indicate a meeting of the 
minds between the parties. If both parties sincerely and honestly 
believe the terms of the contract where as each of their 
testimonies indicated, then there was no meeting of the minds and 
thus no valid enforceable contract. 
In his oral ruling from the bench, which the trial court filed 
as part of the transcript, the court stated that both Wahlquist and 
Hatch appeared honest in their belief that the terms of the 
transaction for the sale of Lot 33 were as each testified.1 The 
court stated: 
I found Mr. Wahlquist to be a credible 
witness. I found Daryl Hatch to be a credible 
witness. I recognize their opinions are 
diametrically opposed. I asked myself the 
question: Is one of them lying? Which is 
always a possibility, and that still is a 
possibility. If it is, I don't know because 
they appeared to be honest. 
What other answer is there? And, of course, 
counsel for the plaintiff cited one of those 
possibilities, and that it#s a mutual mistake 
xHanson v. Hanson. 736 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah Crt. App. 1987) 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) explicitly authorizes this court to look 
beyond the written Findings of Fact to the trial record and 
evaluate the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings). See also 
Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neely Const. Co.
 r 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 
1984) (where, as in this case, see Argument 2, written findings are 
incomplete, inadequate or ambiguous, the court may look to the 
trial court's oral decision). 
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of the parties. That all this time the 
plaintiff was expecting a two-step method, and 
the defendant was saying, 'Boy, I've got a 
real bargain on this property. They finally 
came down to $40,000.00 because that's what 
they're going to sign all of the contracts 
for.' And so he proceeds on it. 
When I find that both of the parties have 
appeared to be honest, when I say both 
parties, I'm talking about Mr. Wahlquist and 
Mr. Hatch, it probably puts me in the belief 
that we're probably talking about a mutual 
mistake more than we're talking about a 
contract to pay the $80,000.00. 
(R. 307-308; Tr. 161-162).2 
It is clear the trial court, after considering the significant 
and conflicting testimony and evidence at trial, concluded there 
was no meeting of the minds between the parties as to the contract 
price for all of Lot 33. Each party honestly believed a different 
sales price had been agreed upon and went forward with the 
transaction when in fact no agreement had been reached. Having 
made the finding that there was no meeting of the minds, the court 
abused its discretion in not awarding restitution damages to avoid 
the Hatches' unjust enrichment at the expense of Embassy. 
2In the portion of Judge Cornaby's ruling quoted above, he 
uses the term "mutual mistake" to describe what is clearly no 
meeting of the minds rather than "mutual mistake" in the legal 
sense. "Mutual mistake" in the legal sense presupposes the parties 
had the same understanding of a fact or matter about which both 
parties are mistaken. See e.g. Robert Linkston, Ltd v. McOuarrier 
741 P.2d 554 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maybey v. Kav Peterson Const. 
Co.. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
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B. Trial Court Erred in Not Awarding Restitution Damages Under 
Embassy's Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Since both parties in this case had an honest, but differing, 
understanding as to the purchase price for all of Lot 33, there was 
no meeting of the minds and no enforceable contract. Since Embassy 
transferred all of Lot 33, valued at $80,000.00, to the Hatches, 
and received only $40,000.00, the trial court erred in not awarding 
restitution damages under the theory of unjust enrichment. 
As is discussed in Argument II, the trial court failed to make 
adequate, specific findings of fact on Embassy's unjust enrichment 
claim to enable Embassy to argue the erroneousness of such findings 
on appeal. Also, because of the lack of specific findings, it is 
difficult to determine upon what evidence the trial court based its 
conclusion of law that "the evidence adduced at trial does not 
support the plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of lack 
of consideration and unjust enrichment" (Tr. 175). Nevertheless, 
had the trial court made a finding of fact on Embassy's unjust 
enrichment claim that denied Embassy recovery, it would have been 
clearly erroneous in that it would be against the clear weight of 
the evidence produced at trial relevant to the elements of unjust 
enrichment. Spytfrerp Title gufrr- QQ. yf Pqther?, 761 P.2d 951, 954 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Unjust enrichment, also known as quasi contract, is one branch 
of quantum mernit and is a legal action in restitution Davis v. 
Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Davis, the Court 
of Appeals held that the trial court correctly found that 
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plaintiff's recovery must be based on quantum meruit to avoid 
unjust enrichment where the court found that no express contract 
existed since there was no meeting of the minds between the 
parties. 
The elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) the defendant 
received the benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the 
defendant of the benefit; and (3) under circumstances that would 
make it unjust ror the defendant to retain the benefit without 
paying for it. Barrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984). 
The measure of recovery under unjust enrichment is the value of the 
benefit conferred en the defendant, or the defendant's gain. 
Do\is, 746 P.2d at 269. 
Regarding the first element of unjust enrichment, there is no 
evidence disputing that defendant was conveyed all of Lot 33, both 
the .9992 acre building lot described in PI. Ex. "1", and the 
remaining portion of the lot, for a total of 1.722 acres. 
Likewise, the evidence clearly establishes that element two, 
defendant's knowledge of a benefit, is satisfied (R. 227-228). 
The third element of unjust enrichment is that the defendant 
receive a benefit "under circumstances that would make it unjust 
for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it." 
Davisf 746 P.2d at 269. This element is satisfied in this case. 
First, the trial court specifically found that the value of 
Lot 33 was $80,000.00 (R. 305; Tr. 174). Two experts experienced 
in valuing real estate in the Bountiful foothills area where Lot 33 
is located testified that they were familiar with the lot and that 
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its value was between $75,000.00 and $90,000.00 (R. 118, 131-134). 
In addition, it was established that at the time Embassy obtained 
the property from Redd Hale, it was valued at $99,000.00 (PI. Ex. 
"16"). Hatch, on the other hand, introduced no evidence that the 
value of Lot 33 differed in any significant amount from the value 
Embassy's experts placed on the property. Thus, the Hatches 
received approximately two acres of prime property with an 
unrestricted view of the Great Salt Lake valued at about $80,000.00 
for only $40,000.00. 
Because there was no meeting of the minds and no enforceable 
contract for the sale of all of Lot 33 for only $40,000.00, it 
would be unjust to allow the Hatches to retain the $40,000.00 value 
they received without paying for it. Embassy had no intention of 
selling the $80,000.00 lot for $40,000.00. Wahlquist, Bangerter 
and Larsen testified that it was their understanding that the sale 
price for the lot was $80,000.00 and that approval would not have 
been given to sell all of the lot for only $40,000.00 (R. 23, 163-
171, 193). To allow the Hatches to retain the $40,000.00 would 
unjustly enriched the Hatches at a $40,000.00 expense to Embassy. 
Although it is very difficult to glean the trial court's 
reasoning and the basis of his decision from his oral findings, the 
oral findings nevertheless suggest the trial court might have been 
reluctant to grant relief under unjust enrichment because a home 
had been built on Lot 33 and a $200,000.00 loan obtained. As the 
court stated: 
It's been suggested to the court that I might 
try reformation of contract or unjust 
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enrichment. I said I don't believe it's 
fraud. I just don't see where any of these 
solve the problem that the court's faced with. 
If there was a mutual mistake of fact, one 
thinking it was $80,000.00, the other thinking 
it was $40,000.00 the court, had there not 
been a house built on it, had there not been a 
$200,000.00 loan on it, it might be easy for 
the court to talk about reformation of 
contract or a rescission of the contract. But 
I can't talk in those terms. 
(R. 308; Tr. 162). The above quote indicates the trial court 
concluded that rescission or reformation of contract is the type of 
relief that must be granted in an unjust enrichment claim and that 
both would be impractical or unjust in this case because a home had 
been built on the property and the Hatches had obtained a large 
loan. Although the court's rationale or reasoning is certainly not 
clear, what is clear is that under an unjust enrichment claim the 
measure of recovery is the value of the benefit conferred upon the 
defendant not reformation or rescission. Davis, 746 P.2d at 269. 
The evidence clearly shows that the value of the benefit conferred 
upon the Hatches was $40,000.00. A monetary judgment in favor of 
Embassy in that amount would not have impaired the market value of 
the home or property, and would not interfer with the Hatches' 
financing. Such an award would only require the Hatches to pay 
fair value for what they received. Accordingly, the trial court 
abused its discretion in not granting Embassy such relief under its 




THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT 
FINDINGS OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSIONS DENYING EMBASSY RELIEF 
Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.P., requires a trial court sitting 
without a jury to make specific findings of fact and state 
separately its conclusions of law based thereon.3 Rule 52(a)'s 
requirement is mandatory and may not be waived. Romrell v. Zions 
Nat. Bank. N.A.. 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). The court's Findings of 
Fact must show that the court's judgment "follows logically from, 
and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1986). As stated in Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P. 2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979): 
The importance of complete, accurate and 
consistent findings of fact in a case tried by 
a judge is essential to the resolution of 
dispute under the proper rule of law. To that 
end, the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached. 
The failure of the trial court to make adequate findings of fact is 
reversible error unless the facts in the record are "'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor 
of the judgment.'" Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987)(quoting Kinkella v. Bauah, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
3Rule 52(a) reads in relevant part: in all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon . . . . Utah R.Civ.P. 52. 
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Embassy asserted several alternative claims for recovery 
including breach of contract, reformation of contract, fraud, 
mutual mistake, lack of consideration and unjust enrichment (Tr. l-
15). Testimony was taken and evidence introduced during one and a 
half days of trial. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court 
entered conclusions of law which denied Embassy recovery on all 
claims plead. The conclusions of law read: 
1. That this court has jurisdiction to decide 
the disputed claims between the parties. 
2. That the evidence adduced at trial does 
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery 
under the theory of breach of contract or 
reformation of contract. 
3. That the evidence adduced at trial does 
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery 
under the theory of fraud. 
4. That the evidence adduced at trial does 
not support the plaintiff's claim for recovery 
under the theory of mutual mistake. 
5. That the evidence adduced at trial does 
not support the plaint if's claim for recovery 
under the theory of lL.k of consideration and 
unjust enrichment. 
6. That the evidence adduced at trial 
requires that title and ownership of Lot 33 
Bridlewood Subdivision Amended be quieted such 
that legal and equitable title vest solely to 
T. Daryl and Maureen Hatch . . . 
* * * * 
(Tr. 175-176). The trial court failed to make findings of fact to 
support its conclusion that Embassy was not entitled to recover 
under any of its claims. The court's findings of fact read as 
follows: 
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1. Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. is a Utah 
corporation, the beneficiary of an assignment 
of interest in any claim that Grenada, Inc. 
and/or Shim Investments may have had against 
Defendants for the purchase of Lot 33 of the 
Bridlewood Subdivision, located in the City of 
Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants T. Daryl Hatch and Maureen 
Hatch are residents of Davis County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The dispute herein involves real property 
located in Davis County and involves a 
controversy which is in excess of $10,000.00. 
4. This court has jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. 
5. The Plaintiff's agents testified that they 
believed very positively that Lot 33 of the 
Bridlewood Subdivision was to have been sold 
to the Hatch's [sic] for $80,000.00. 
6. Defendant also testified very 
affirmatively that he only agreed to pay 
$40,000.00 for Lot 33, and in fact that he 
could only afford a building lot priced at 
$40,000.00 or less. 
7. All of the written documentation 
concerning the sale of Lot 33 to the 
Defendants indicates that the purchase price 
was $40,000.00. 
8. The Court finds no distinction between the 
wording of the first Earnest Money Agreement 
dated September 12, 1986, which reads 'a 
portion of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision' for 
$40,000.00, and the subsequent Earnest Money 
Agreement of the same date which reads 'a 
portion of Bridlewood Subdivision Lot 33' for 
$40,000.00. 
9. The Court is persuaded that there is no 
reason why Plaintiff or its predecessor could 
not have divided Lot 33 by utilizing a 'flag 
lot.' 
10. The Court further finds no reason why Lot 
33 could not have been divided into three 
lots, assuming the necessary additional 
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improvements were made and appropriate 
approvals were obtained. 
11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen 
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness, 
particularly when she testified that it was 
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. 
12. The Court finds that the evidence is not 
clear as to the why Maureen Hatch's signature 
is the only one which appears on the Earnest 
Money Agreement. 
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant 
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for 
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he 
was buying it for $40,000.00. 
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all of 
the loan and closing documents prepared by the 
Plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of 
Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
15. The Court is convinced that if in fact 
both parties had agreed that the purchase 
price of Lot 33 was to have been $80,000.00, 
they would also had to have been involved in a 
scheme to deceive the bank for the Hatches' 
the [sic] long term financing. If that were 
the case, the Plaintiff would be before the 
Court with 'unclean hands.' 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff could 
have sold the front portion of Lot 33 for 
$40,000.00 to the Hatches, and reserved 
ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an 
additional $40,000.00, but chose not to do so. 
17. The evidence presented at tria? indicates 
that Lot 33 likely had a value of $80,000.00 
at the time of the sale to the Hatches; 
although, there is some question as to whether 
Lot 33 could have been divided into three lots 
which would have sold for $33,000.00 each. 
18. The evidence supports the fact that at 
the time the Hatches bought Lot 33, the 
Bridlewood Subdivision was incomplete. The 
evidence indicates that it would have cost 
between $8,000-10,000 per lot to make the 
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necessary improvements to divide Lot 33 into 
three separate lots. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff's 
predecessor may have been motivated to sell 
Lot 33 for $40,000.00 as a result of its 
pending bankruptcy and financial difficulties. 
20. Plaintiff is required to meet the burden 
of proof, which in this case is by "clear and 
convincing" evidence. 
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not 
met its burden of proof. 
(Tr. 172-174; see also Addendum "B") 
The trial court failed to make findings of fact on each of 
Embassy's claims. The trial court's factual findings are merely a 
list of factual conclusions and do not show how they relate, or 
their relevance, to the claims raised by Embassy. Nor, do the 
Findings of Fact disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusions on each of Embassy's claims was reached as required in 
order for this court to perform its review function. Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). In addition, the lack of 
findings of fact on each of Embassy's claims puts Embassy in a 
difficult position. That is, Embassy has no specific factual 
findings on its claims to argue are clearly erroneous. 
The trial court also failed make to adequate findings in his 
oral ruling from the bench (see Addendum "A"). Mention of 
Embassy's different claims is interspersed in the ruling, but 
without a clear enunciation of the findings on the particular 
claims. It is difficult to determine when the trial court begins 
to address a particular claim and when he concludes his findings on 
that claim and begins discussing another. The court's oral ruling 
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does not show that his conclusions follow locally from the 
evidence. Nor, does the ruling reveal the steps by which the trial 
court reached his conclusions. For example, the trial court makes 
several findings which are clearly inconsistent with denying 
Embassy recovery under one or more of its claims. Yet, there is no 
explanation nor resolution of the inconsistent findings. For 
example, the trial court found that the value of Lot 33 was 
$80,000.00, rather than the $40,000.00 paid by the Hatches (R. 305; 
Tr. 159). The court found that both parties were truthful in their 
testimony as to the understanding of the terms for the sale of Lot 
33 (R. 307, 308; Tr.161, 162). The court also acknowledged that 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement reflected a contract for the sale 
of only a portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 (R. 302-303; Tr. 156-
157). These findings indicate Embassy is entitled to recovery 
under its unjust enrichment claim. However, having made these 
findings, the court failed to explain why Embassy was not entitled 
to any relief under its unjust enrichment claim, or any of its 
claims for that matter. 
As discussed above, the trial court's failure to make adequate 
findings of fact which show that its conclusions denying Embassy 
recovery follows logically from and is supported by the evidence, 
and where the findings of fact fail to detail and disclose the 
steps by which the trial court reached its conclusion on each of 
the factual claims raised, the trial court's judgment should be 
vacated and the case remanded unless the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
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favor of the judcpnent." Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. As is shown 
throughout this brief (see Arguments I and III), the evidence 
presented at trial is not uncontroverted and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the Hatches. Accordingly, the trial 
court's judgment should be vacated and this case remanded for the 
entry of proper findings of fact. 
III. 
SEVERAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF 
FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Although the trial court failed to make findings of fact on 
each of Embassy's claims which adequately support the trial court's 
conclusions, the court nevertheless entered twenty-one written 
findings of fact. Four of these findings of fact are clearly 
erroneous in that they are against the clear weight of evidence 
produced at trial. Southern Title Guar. Co. vs. Bethers, 761 P.2d 
951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The trial court's written finding of fact No. 7 reads: 
7. All of the written documentation 
concerning the sell of Lot 3 3 to the 
defendants indicates that the purchase 
price was $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 172). 
This finding is clearly erroneous. "All" of the documents 
concerning the sale of Lot 33 do not indicate that the purchase 
price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. As has been discussed throughout 
the brief, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Exhibit "6", clearly 
shows that the parties agreed that only a portion of Lot 33 would 
be sold for $40,000.00 (PI. Ex. "6"). Also, Exhibit "5", another 
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Earnest Money generated from the transaction, but never signed, 
provides that only a portion of Lot 33 would be sold for $40,000.00 
(PI. Ex. "5"). 
There are no documents which show the sale price for Lot 33 at 
$40,000.00. The Warranty Deed which conveyed all of Lot 33 to the 
Hatches contains no sale price. Likewise, the Trust Deed Note and 
accompanying Trust Deed do not shr w that the purchase price for Lot 
33 was $40,000.00. The note and 3eed only show that the Hatches 
executed a Deed of Trust to all of Lot 33 in favor of Shim to 
secure repayment on the Trust Deed Note. Nowhere in the note is it 
indicated that the total purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
Accordingly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 7 is clearly 
erroneous in that (1) the Earnest Money Sales Agreement certainly 
proves that not "all" documents concerning the sale of Lot 33 
indicates the purchase price of $40,000.00; and (2) there is, in 
fact, no document showing the sale price for Lot 33 at $40,000.00. 
Similarly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14 is clearly 
erroneous. Finding of Fact No. 14 reads: 
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all of 
the loan and closing documents prepared by the 
Plaintiffs indicate that the purchase price of 
Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). 
Again, the Earnest Money Sales Agreements, PI. Ex. "5" and 
"6", do not indicate the total sale price for Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. Both documents provide for the sale of only a portion 
of Lot 33 for $40,000.00. That portion was described as .9992 
acres in the Consortium documents (PI. Ex. "1" and "4"). In 
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addition, the loan and closing documents do not indicate that the 
purchase price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. The Purchaser's 
Statement and Seller's Statement, defendants' Exhibit "1" and 
plaintiff's Exhibit "7" respectively, indicate the purchase price 
of $40,000.00 for a street address, not Lot 33. Nowhere in either 
document is there an indication that the total purchase price for 
Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Nor do the loan documents which Finding No. 
14 purportedly refers to indicate a purchase price for Lot 33 at 
$40,000.00 (D. Ex. Exhibit "4" and "3"). The documents simply 
indicate Shim was to receive $20,000.00 from the Hatches' loan from 
First Security Bank and authorized the disbursement of that 
$20,000.00. Accordingly, the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 14 
is clearly erroneous because neither the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement nor loan and closing documents indicate the purchase 
price for Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 11 is clearly erroneous. 
Finding of Fact No. 11 reads: 
11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen 
Hatch to be a credible and reliable witness, 
particularly when she testified that it was 
her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). 
Maureen Hatch's trial testimony appears at page 155 of the 
record and continues through page 159. At no time during her 
testimony did Maureen Hatch testify it was her understanding the 
cost of Lot 33 was $40,000.00. Since Maureen Hatch never testified 
that it was her understanding that the cost of Lot 3 3 was 
28 
$40,000.00, such a finding that she did so testify is clearly 
erroneous. 
The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 13 is clearly erroneous. 
Finding of Fact No. 13 reads: 
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant 
Daryl Hatch believed he was buying Lot 33 for 
$80,000.00, he would not have told his wife he 
was buying it for $40,000.00. 
(Tr. 173). 
Daryl Hatch's trial testimony appears at page 227 of the 
record and runs through page 263. Embassy's counsel has reviewed 
this trial testimony carefully and at no point during Mr. Hatch's 
testimony did he testify that he told his wife he was buying Lot 3 3 
for $40,000.00. Nor, was there any other testimony at trial 
indicating Mr. Hatch told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for 
$40,000.00. Since there is no testimony indicating Daryl Hatch 
told his wife he was buying Lot 33 for $40,000.00, the finding of 
fact that Mr. Hatch did tell his wife he was buying the lot for 
$40,000 is clearly erroneous. 
As the above arguments indicate, the trial court's Findings of 
Fact Nos. 7, 11, 13, and 14 are clearly erroneous in that they are 
against the clear weight of evidence produced at trial. 
Accordingly, this court should consider the erroneousness of the 
findings in any attempts this court may make to determine the basis 
for the trial court's ruling denying Embassy recovery on each and 
all of its claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Embassy respectfully 
requests this court reverse the trial court and enter judgment in 
favor of Embassy and against the Hatches for $40,000.00• In the 
alternative, Embassy respectfully requests this court to remand 
this case to the trial court for specific and adequate findings of 
fact on all of Embassy's claims. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1992. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
HEINZ~J. MAHLER 
KIRK G. GIBBS 
Attornesy for Plaintiff 
Embassy Group, Inc. 
30 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
this Y\ day of -tiupluilA)5!r, 1992, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant - Embassy Group, Inc., to the 
following: 
Kent L. Christiansen 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
300 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
j^f^y^^/ 
31 
A D D E N D U M 
A 


























PILEOW CLEF'S f|!fjfE 
jaZI U S B * 
ORIGINAL 
IN THE CIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EMBASSY GROUP, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DARYL and MAUREEN E. HATCH, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 900748277 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY 
DECEMBER 13, 1991 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
COURT'S RULING 
Reported by: KELLY BROWN HICKEN, 
CSR, RPR 
n/ fP CD U:A.„ m, 
• rt Rc*nnrtP>r 
Reporter's Transcript of Court's Ruling, taken at Davis 
County, Utah, on Friday, December 13, 1991, before KELLY 
BROWN HICKEN, Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered 
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah. 
* * * * * 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: 
For the Plaintiff: KIPP and CHRISTIAN 
BY: HEINZ J. MAHLER 
Attorney At Law 
1751 East 400 South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For Defendant: MUELLER & CHRISTIANSEN 
BY: KENT L. CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorney at Law 
300 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
en Court Reporter 1 
FARMINGTON, UTAH, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 1 3 , 1991 
* * * * * 
Now, the Court will make the following findings and 
decision in this matter: 
First, that the plaintiff is a corporation, that 
its agents have been very positive in testifying that the lot 
was to be sold for $80,000. Defendant has just been as — 
just as positive. 
When I use "the defendant," I'm going to talk about 
Daryl Hatch as opposed to his wife. I do that because 
Maureen Hatch apparently had very, very little to do with 
this transaction or any conversations having to do with it. 
But the defendant indicated that he couldn't afford 
a lot in excess of $40,000. In fact, he was looking for a 
lot in the $30,000 area and hopefully even lower than that. 
Plaintiff's agents are positive that the defendant 
is lying. And, of course, one of the prime issues this Court 
has to decide is whether or not Daryl Hatch is lying. The 
Court listened to him carefully, and I can't say that he's 
lying. All of the written documents show that the sale price 
was $40,000. From one point of view, that's pretty 
persuasive. 
I am, of course, aware that Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1 — I can't conceive of it having been created for 
any reason other than a two-step payment as the parties have 
nffrlhi ^Bstoum cJfick&n Court Reporter 2 
i I testified to. I recognize that Defendant's Exhibit — 
2 Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which is the earnest money agreement 
3 signed by Mr. Wahlquist dated September 5th, 1986, said "a 
4 portion of Lot 33" for $40,000. I'm aware that Plaintiff's 
5 Exhibit 6, which had Maureen Hatch's signature on it said "a 
6 portion of Bridalwood Subdivision, Lot 33" for $40,000. I 
7 don't think the wording of those makes any difference to the 
8 Court. I think both was saying the same thing so far as the 
9 expression of that it was a portion of a lot for $40,000. 
10 The Court's been persuaded or recognizes that 
11 there's no reason why the plaintiff could not have severed 
12 the flag lot into a separate lot had it chosen to do so. I'm 
13 aware in saying that that Mr. Wahlquist testified that to do 
14 so would make it worthless. The Court can't see why that 
15 would be so. The line was drawn across a portion of the plat 
16 showing Lot 33. I'm looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 17. And 
17 I don't recall which document was brought in and a line was 
18 drawn across showing what the original three lots were. But 
19 nothing had changed to make that flag lot severed worth less 
20 than the 40,000 that was testified to by one of the experts 
21 that he thought that flag lot was worth, it could have — 
22 All of the conditions were still there, so the flag lot could 
23 have been sold as a flag lot and nothing had changed as far 
24 I as I can tell. 
25 Now, just a word or two about Maureen Hatch. As I 
xovjti cHicKLn Court Reporter 
said, she knew little about it. It was certainly her opinion 
that it was a sale for $40,000. She appeared to be an honest 
witness before the Court. She doesn't remember why she was 
the one that signed the earnest money agreement. Defendant 
Daryl doesn't seem to remember why she was the one who signed 
it. Mr. Wahlquist doesn't seem to remember why it was that 
she signed it. It's obvious she did sign it, however. 
But I can't understand if it had been a sale in the 
defendant's mind for $80,000 why he would not have conveyed 
that information to his wife Maureen, why he would have let 
her believe that it was only 40,000. Sometime that would 
have had to have been a difficult thing to explain. 
All the written documents do show $40,000, and that 
does create a problem so far as statute of frauds. If the 
sale price was really 80,000 and if both plaintiff and 
defendant understood it was 80,000, then the Court can't 
escape from the fact that they were conspiring to deceive the 
lender bank. And I've indicated — I recognize Mr. Wahlquist 
said that was not so, that "In real estate transactions, we 
will try to do everything we can to sell a lot and to 
accommodate people which takes all kinds of transactions," 
and I recognize it does. 
But the bank was making a determination apparently 
in this case that the maximum that they wanted on less than 
one acre, at least this is the argument of Mr. Wahlquist, was 
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1 $40,000. And so if they had gone ahead with the transaction 
2 from the view of Mr. Wahlquist, it would have been with what 
3 I we in the law call unclean hands. But it could only have 
4 been done by both unclean hands on both parties in which both 
5 would be appearing before the Court in essentially the same 
6 position. 
7 I think the plaintiff as I've said could have — if 
8 that was the agreement, the plaintiff could have sold the 
9 front lot for 40,000, reserved the rear lot, the flag lot to 
10 be later purchased by the defendant or to be sold to somebody 
11 else for that $40,000. 
12 Now, as to the value of the lots. We had some 
13 testimony on that, some testimony that suggested that perhaps 
14 Lot 34 — No. Lot — I think it was Lot 36 that was worth 
15 18,000 because of its location, Lot 35 was worth 30,000, 
16 Lot 36 was worth 30,000, that Lot 37 was a little more, and I 
17 don't believe we ever got a price on that, although it was a 
18 little more than the others. But much of its land was not 
19 usable as you go toward the north end of the lot. 
20 So what's the value of Lot 33? I think the 
21 evidence has clearly shown to the Court that the value of 
22 Lot 33 was probably $80,000. Originally there had been a 
23 trade as we all know for the three — the original plot 
24 showed three lots in what's been known as Lot 33, each of 
25 those lots priced at $33,000. There may be some question of 
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i whether they would have actually sold for 33#000 or whether 
2 they would have sold for 30,000 or 28,000 or some other 
3 figure. But they were probably as an offering price worth 
4 $33,000. 
5 The entire development was not completed as to all 
6 three lots, and so the value that would have — or the amount 
7 that would have been expended to make them three lots wasn't 
8 entirely put into it. One of the expert witnesses estimated 
9 that it may take the value from each of the two lots 
10 separately as 8,000 to $10,000. And if we take that $99,000 
11 for the three lots and subtract the 8 to 10 from it, we're 
12 right down to the $80,000 valuation. I think that was the 
13 value of the lot at the time when it was sold to the 
14 defendant. 
15 Now, of course, the Court has to ask the question: 
16 Did the plaintiff actually sell the lot for 40,000? Did they 
17 attempt? What reason in the Court's mind would they have for 
18 selling a $80,000 lot for $40,000? They were in financial 
19 trouble, and I suppose Mr. Wahlquist knew it at the time. 
20 And this transaction took place in early November of 1986, 
21 and he was leaving in December of 1986. There was a form of 
22 bankruptcy filed in February of 1987. So that's perhaps one 
23 explanation. One can always surmise that perhaps the company 
24 needed capital right at the time for transactions, but they 
25 weren't getting that much cash. They were only getting 
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20,000. One can say that's quite a bit. But for running of 
a corporation with the number of full-time employees 
apparently that Granada had at the time, that's not all that 
significant. It certainly — The other 20,000 of the 40,000 
was to be paid within a year's period of time and, in fact, 
was paid in late July of 1987. 
Now, part of the Court's approach to this case is I 
recognize that the plaintiff has the burden of proof. And 
that's very significant. Plaintiff has, of course, the 
burden of proof and preponderance of the evidence. Defendant 
hasn't come right out and said it, but said "When we're 
dealing with the statute of fraud, we're dealing with the 
clear and convincing degree of proof." 
The Court has not been persuaded by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the price was $80,000 with the two-step 
payment method. I found Mr. Wahlquist to be a credible 
witness. I found Daryl Hatch to be a credible witness. I 
recognize their opinions are diametrically opposed. I ask 
myself the question: Is one of them lying? which is always 
a possibility, and that still is a possibility. If it is, I 
don't know because they appeared to be honest. 
What other answer is there? And, of course, 
counsel for the plaintiff cited one of those possibilities, 
and that's that it's a mutual mistake of the parties. That 
all this time the plaintiff was expecting a two-step method, 
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and the defendant was saying, "Boy, I've got a real bargain 
on this property. They finally came down to 40,000 because 
that's what they're going to sign all the contracts for." 
And so he proceeds on it. 
When I find that both of the parties have appeared 
to be honest, when I say both parties, I'm talking about 
Mr. Wahlquist and Mr. Hatch, it probably puts me in the 
belief that we're probably talking about a mutual mistake 
more than we are talking about a contract to pay the 80,000. 
Then the Court has to look at the fact that Mr. Hatch on 
reliance on that 40,000 from his point of view apparently 
borrowed about $200,000 from his bank. 20,000 of that paid 
the balance as per the contract. 
It's been suggested to the Court that I might try 
reformation of contract or unjust enrichment. I said I don't 
believe it's fraud. I just don't see where any of these 
solve the problem that the Court's faced with. If there was 
a mutual mistake of fact, one thinking it was 80,000, the 
other thinking it was 40,000, the Court, had there not been a 
house built on it, had there not been a $200,000 loan on it, 
it might be easy for the Court to talk about a reformation of 
the contract or a recision of the contract. But I can't talk 
in those terms. And where all of the documents were drawn 
for $40,000, I think what that does is put the burden on the 
plaintiff. 
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x And I guess I'm saying that burden has not been met 
2 within the — with the findings that I've made here. And so 
3 the plaintiff is not entitled to any of those remedies 
4 they've asked the Court for. And so it's going to be a 
5 judgment in effect for the defendant, and ask the defendant 
6 to draw the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Any 
7 questions? 
8 I borrowed a couple of these. They weren't part of 
9 the Court's record. So if you'll come and get your 
10 depositions back. 
11 THE CLERK: The originals were not in the office. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. We do not have the originals, all 
13 right. The record can show that we do not have the two 
14 depositions that were made use of during trial. 
15 Whenever you're going to use those at trial, the 
16 originals of those documents should be supplied to the Court 
17 by whoever it is that's the custodian of the originals. 
18 That's it. Okay. That's all. Thank you. 
19 MR. MAHLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
20 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
21 (Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.) 
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1 I STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss. 
2 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
3 I, KELLY BROWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R. and Notary Public 
4 for the State of Utah, residing in Salt Lake County, certify: 
5 That the proceedings were taken before me at the 
6 time and place herein set forth; 
7 That all proceedings had of record at the time of 
8 the proceeding were recorded stenographically by me and 
9 were thereafter transcribed into typewritten form by me, 
10 and I hereby certify that the foregoing typewritten 
11 transcript as typed by me is a full, true and correct 
12 record of my stenographic notes so taken; 
13 I further certify that I am neither counsel for 
14 nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise 
15 interested in the outcome thereof. 
16 I IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name and 





KELLY B#OWN HICKEN, C.S.R., R.P.R., 
21 | Notary Public. Notary Commission 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Kent L. Christiansen of 
CHRISTIANSEN & SONNTAG 
300 IBM Plaza 
420 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-3762 
Attorneys for Defendants 
fllEDIHCLt-A'S OFFICE 
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CLERK. 2ND C S I . COURT 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EMBASSY GROUP, I N C . , 
Pla int i f f , 
vs. 
T. DARYL and MAUREEN E. 
HATCH, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 48277 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for a non-
jury trial on December 12th and 13th, 1991, the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby, Second District Court Judge, presiding. 
Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, 
appeared on behalf of the Defendants, T. Daryl Hatch and 
Maureen Hatch (hereinafter "Hatchs"). Heinz Mahler of the law 
firm of Kipp & Christian, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
Embassy Group, Inc. (hereinafter "Embassy"). The parties 
having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary 
exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the 
Court having reviewed the file, exhibits, and memoranda 
submitted by the parties, the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and good cause appearing therefore, the Court hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. is a Utah corporation, 
the beneficiary of an assignment of interest in any claim that 
Granada, Inc. and/or Shim Investments may have had against 
Defendants for the purchase of Lot 33 of the Bridlewood 
Subdivision, located in the City of Bountiful, Davis County, 
State of Utah. 
2. Defendants T. Daryl Hatch and Maureen Hatch are 
residents of Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. The dispute herein involves real property located in 
Davis County and involves a controversy which is in excess of 
$10,000.00. 
4. This court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
5. The Plaintiff's agents testified that they believed 
very positively that Lot 3 3 of the Bridlewood Subdivision was 
to have been sold to the Hatch's for $80,000.00. 
6. Defendant also testified very affirmatively that he 
only agreed to pay $40,000.00 for Lot 33, and in fact that he 
could only afford a building lot priced at $40,000.00 or less. 
7. All of the written documentation concerning the sale 
of Lot 33 to the Defendants indicates that the purchase price 
was $40,000.00. 
8. The Court finds no distinction between the wording of 
the first Earnest Money Agreement dated September 12, 1986, 
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which reads ,fa portion of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision" for 
$40,000.00, and the subsequent Earnest Money Agreement of the 
same date which reads "a portion of Bridlewood Subdivision Lot 
33" for $40,000.00. 
9. The Court is persuaded that there is no reason why 
Plaintiff or its predecessor could not have divided Lot 33 by 
utilizing a "flag lot." 
10. The Court further finds no reason why Lot 33 could 
not have been divided into three lots, assuming the necessary 
additional improvements were made and appropriate approvals 
were obtained. 
11. The Court also found Defendant Maureen Hatch to be a 
credible and reliable witness, particularly when she testified 
that it was her understanding that the cost of Lot 33 was 
$40,000.00. 
12. The Court finds that the evidence is not clear as to 
why Maureen Hatch's signature is the only one which appears on 
the Earnest Money Agreement. 
13. The Court is convinced that if Defendant Daryl Hatch 
believed he was buying Lot 33 for $80,000.00, he would not have 
told his wife he was buying it for $40,000.00. 
14. The Earnest Money Agreement and all of the loan and 
closing documents prepared by the Plaintiffs indicate that the 
purchase price of Lot 33 was $40,000.00. 
15. The Court is convinced that if in fact both parties 
had agreed that the purchase price of Lot 33 was to have been 
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$80,000.00, they would also had to have been involved in a 
scheme to deceive the bank for the Hatchs1 the long term 
financing. If that were the case, the Plaintiff would be 
before the Court with "unclean hands." 
16. The Court finds that the Plaintiff could have sold 
the front portion of Lot 33 for $40,000.00 to the Hatchs, and 
reserved ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an 
additional $40,000.00, but chose not to do so. 
17. The evidence presented at trial indicates that Lot 33 
likely had a value of $80,000.00 at the time of the sale to the 
Hatchs; although, there is some question as to whether Lot 33 
could have been divided into three lots which would have sold 
for $33,000.00 each. 
18. The evidence supports the fact that at the time the 
Hatchs bought Lot 33, the Bridlewood Subdivision was 
incomplete. The evidence indicates that it would have cost 
between $8,000-10,000 per lot to make the necessary 
improvements to divide Lot 33 into three separate lots. 
19. The Court finds that Plaintiff's predecessor may have 
been motivated to sell Lot 33 for $40,000.00 as a result of its 
pending bankruptcy and financial difficulties. 
20. Plaintiff is required to meet the burden of proof, 
which in this case is by "clear and convincing" evidence. 
21. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met its burden 
of proof. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the 
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following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this court has jurisdiction to decide the 
disputed claims between the parties. 
2. That the evidence adduced at trial does not support 
the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of breach 
of contract or reformation of the contract. 
3. That the evidence adduced at trial does not support 
the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of fraud. 
4. That the evidence adduced at trial does not support 
the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of mutual 
mistake. 
5. That the evidence adduced at trial does not support 
the Plaintiff's claim for recovery under the theory of lack of 
consideration and unjust enrichment. 
6. That the evidence adduced at trial requires that title 
and ownership of Lot 33 Bridlewood Subdivision Amended be 
quieted such that legal and equitable title vest solely to T. 
Daryl and Maureen Hatch. Plaintiff should be directed to 
immediately cause that certain Notice of Interest filed at Book 
1341 Page 951 of the official records of the Davis County 
Recorder to be withdrawn. 
7. That judgment upon the merits should be entered in 
favor of the Defendants, T. Daryl and Maureen Hatch; that the 
claims of the Plaintiff, Embassy Group, Inc. should be 
5 
dismissed with prejudice; and that Plaintiff take nothing 
therefrom. 
DATED this JLf day of Dmjuuibgr, 19^, 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DougT&sh*£. Cornaby ^ " 
District Court Judge 
By: 
Heinz Mahler 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U.S. Mails, 
postage prepaid, this day of December, 1991, and properly 
addressed as follows: 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
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OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
HEINZ J. HAHLER - NO. 3832 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney for plaintiff 
Embassy Group, Inc. 
City Centre I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
(801) 521-3773 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Jul* 2 2SflT9Z 
CO'JR CLERK, 2NDDIST. U T 
BY. 
DEPUTYCLERI 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EMBASSY GROUP, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
T. DARYL and MAUREEN E. 
HATCH, 
Defendants. 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 48277 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
Plaintiff Embassy Group, Inc. objects to the proposed Findings 
of Fact submitted by defendants and respectfully requests 
modifications as follows: 
1. Paragraph 5 should state the following: 
Mark Wahlquist and Grant Bangerter testified that they 
agreed to sell Lot 33 for $80,000 in a two-step process, 
$40,000 at closing and an additional $40,000 within two years 
from the time that defendants completed building their new 
home on Lot 33. 
2. Paragraph 7 should state the following: 
All of the written documentation concerning the sale of 
Lot 33 to the defendants indicated that the purchase price was 
$40,000 for "a portion of Lot 33"• 
3. Paragraph 9 should state the following: 
The court is persuaded that there is no reason why 
plaintiff or its predecessor could not have divided Lot 33 by 
utilizing a flag lot, but did not do so, because defendants 
wanted to purchase the entire lot. 
4. Paragraph 10 should state the following: 
The court finds that Lot 33 could have been divided into 
three lots for which preliminary approval had already been 
obtained, assuming the necessary improvements were made and 
that final approval was obtained. 
5. As to paragraph 11, other than the finding that Maureen 
Hatch was a credible witness, plaintiff objects to the balance of 
the paragraph in that no such finding was made by the court and in 
fact defendant Maureen Hatch testified that she had no recollection 
concerning details of the purchase price. 
6. As to paragraph 13, plaintiff objects to the same for the 
reason that there was no such finding by the court. 
2 
7. Paragraph 14 should state the following: 
The Earnest Money Agreements prepared by the plaintiff 
indicate that the purchase price of "a portion of Lot 33" was 
$40,000. All of the loan and closing documents also indicated 
a purchase price of $40,000 but only referred to a street 
address in connection with the property. 
8. Paragraph 15 should state the following: 
If in fact an agreement was reached to purchase all of 
Lot 33 for $80,000 in a two-step process as plaintiff's agents 
testified was proposed by Daryl Hatch, the court could 
construe that such an agreement could be a proposal to mislead 
the bank providing Hatch's long term financing, since the bank 
requested of Hatch, that Hatch obtain a building lot of less 
than one acre in size. If that were the case, then both 
parties may have come before the court with "unclean hands". 
9. Paragraph 16 should state the following: 
The court finds that the plaintiff could have sold the 
front portion of Lot 33 for $40,000 to the Hatches and 
reserved ownership of the rear portion of Lot 33 for an 
additional $40,000, but at closing, Mark Wahlquist conveyed 
title to "all of Lot 33" based on his belief that Hatch had 
agreed to pay an additional $40,000 for said rear portion of 
Lot 33 at a future date. 
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10. Paragraph 17 should state the following: 
The evidence presented at trial indicates that Lot 33 had 
a value of approximately $80,000 at the time of the sale to 
the Hatches, 
11. Paragraph 18 should state the following: 
The evidence supports the fact that at the time the 
Hatches bought Lot 33, the Bridlewood Subdivision was 
incomplete. The evidence indicates that it could have cost 
between $8,000 to $10,000 per lot to make the necessary 
improvements to divide Lot 33 into three separate lots, which 
total amount for three lots is not significantly different 
from developing Lot 33 as one lot. 
12. As to paragraph 19, plaintiff objects to this finding for 
the reason that there was no such finding by the court. 
13. Paragraph 21 should state the following: 
The court finds that the plaintiff has not met its burden 
of proof that defendants committed fraud, that plaintiff is 
entitled to recision of the contract, that plaintiff is 
entitled to reformation of the contract to enforce the oral 
agreement or that plaintiff is otherwise entitled to enforce 
the oral contractual agreement at issue. The plaintiff has 
met its burden of proof that there was a mutual mistake of, 
by, and between the parties concerning the terms and 
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conditions of the sale of "all of Lot 33" [It should also be 
noted that the court made no finding concerning the unjust 
enrichment claim.]. 
Plaintiff objects to defendants' proposed Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 for the reason that the 
court did find that the parties were mutually mistaken as to the 
terms and conditions of the sale of "all of Lot 33". 
2. As to paragraph 5, plaintiff objects in that the court 
made no finding of any kind concerning plaintiff's theory of 
recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment. 
3. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 6 and 7 in that, based on 
the Findings of Fact by the court, there was a finding of mutual 
mistake by the parties as to the terms and conditions of the sale 
for "all of Lot 33", although it appears that at the time that the 
court ruled from the bench, no remedy was provided for the mutual 
mistake of the parties. It is plaintiff's contention that the 
court should provide a remedy consistent with the court's Findings 
of Fact, specifically that the contract for sale only referred to 
"a portion of Lot 33" and that title to "all of Lot 33" was 
transferred only due to the mistaken belief that an additional 
$40,000 payment would be forthcoming. 
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Accordingly, paragraph 6 and 7 of the Conclusions of Law 
should be amended to reflect that the title and ownership interest 
of defendants should equitably be only in ,fa portion of Lot 33" and 
that title to the rear portion of Lot 33 should re-vest in 
plaintiff. 
DATED this £D^ day of January, 1992. 
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Civil No. 48277 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for a non-
jury trial on December 12th and 13th, 1991, the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby, Second District Court Judge, presiding. 
Kent L. Christiansen of the law firm of Christiansen & Sonntag, 
appeared on behalf of the Defendants, T. Daryl Hatch and 
Maureen Hatch (hereinafter "Hatchs") . Heinz Mahler of the law 
firm of Kipp & Christian, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
Embassy Group, Inc. (hereinafter "Embassy"). The parties 
having adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary 
exhibits, and having argued the matter to the Court, and the 
Court having reviewed the file, exhibits, and memoranda 





of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court being fully advised 
in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it is 
hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment upon the 
merits be entered in favor of the Defendants, T. Daryl and 
Maureen Hatch; that the claims of the Plaintiff, Embassy Group, 
Inc. are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and that Plaintiffs 
shall take nothing therefrom. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that title and ownership of Lot 33 
Amended Bridlewood Subdivision, is hereby quieted such that 
legal and equitable title shall vest solely to T. Daryl and 
Maureen Hatch. Plaintiff is directed to immediately cause that 
certain Notice of Interest filed at Book 1341 Page 951 of the 
official records of the Davis County Recorder to be withdrawn. 
DATED this #-f day of Dei Hwfaer, 19^T. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^^ougla^lj^? Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By: 
Heinz Mahler 
Attorney for Plaint i f f 
0090405 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Judgment by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid, this day of 
December, 1991, and properly addressed as follows: 
Heinz J. Mahler 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
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